Preface
In this brief, Research Scholar Greg Hannsgen and I focus on the risks and possibilities ahead for the US economy. Using a Keynesian approach and drawing from the commentary of other observers, we analyze publicly available data in order to assess the strength and durability of the expansion that probably began in 2009. We focus on four broad groups of markets that have shown signs of stress for the last several years: financial markets, markets for household goods and services, commodity markets, and labor markets. This kind of analysis does not yield numerical forecasts of economic variables but may unearth important clues about the short-term outlook for the country's economic well-being, in the narrow sense of output and income.
Like Milton Friedman before them, most modern-day academic opponents of fiscal stimulus have argued that monetary policy easing will fail to keep real interest rates low as long as governments are putting great demands on capital markets. This theory has not been borne out in practice following the expansionary policy response to the Great Recession, which has reduced the yields of low-risk, short-term securities and resulted in lower rates for other types of issues and loans crucial to corporate bottom lines. Interest rates are at historical lows-one of many signs that monetarist scenarios leading to high inflation are not being played out-and both monetary easing and fiscal stimulus have had some impact on demand by the US sector that is financially weakest: the household sector. Inflation-adjusted measures of the volume of household expenditures, including retail sales and personal consumption expenditures, sustained positive growth rates from midsummer of 2010 to year's end. Unfortunately, the growth rate of personal consumption expenditures turned slightly negative in January, and retail sales have not been strong in the first two months of this year.
In addition, seasonally adjusted industrial production was flat in February, and real earnings growth has been meager at best since the recovery began. In the aftermath of a severe recession, a modest-to-severe financial retrenchment, marked by tightened lending standards, an increased aversion to indebtedness, and more conservative investment tactics, tends to occur almost by necessity-as Hyman Minsky observed. Overall, consumer credit has yet to expand after stagnating in 2007-09, though the bleak picture painted by recent data on credit-card debt levels was offset by the attainment of a new record for noncredit card consumer debt-approximately $1.6 trillion.
In Europe, the banking system has been threatened by the sovereign debt crisis, and numerous institutions with large holdings of government bonds are not yet out of the woods. The banking industries in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain are surviving only by depositing securities worth hundreds of billions of euros at the European Central Bank, in return for cash. The long-run presence of financial fragility looms large in our view, compared to the supposedly excessive demands for capital generated by high government deficits.
Although the dollar's value against the major foreign currencies still seems to be trending downward, recent data show that the trade deficit widened by about $6 billion in January, to $46 billion, largely due to increases in the cost of imported oil. In the broader commodities market, the prices for corn, soybeans, cotton, and cattle have made double-digit and triple-digit gains over the past year. If commodity prices climb broadly and sharply, the Fed could face the prospect of a serious episode of cost-push inflation similar to the one that occurred during much of the 1970s and early 1980s.
Unfortunately, the labor market is ill positioned to deal with a double whammy of rising commodity prices and a monetarypolicy tightening. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate stood at 8.9 percent in February, reflecting only a tiny drop from the January level of 9.0 percent, and labor market data show every sign of a widespread and severe weakness in aggregate demand. Unless there is new resolve for effective government action on the jobs front, drastic cuts in much-needed federal, state, and local programs will be the order of the day in the United States as in much of Europe. The bottom line: markets cannot be counted on to solve a long-lasting macroeconomic crisis like ours in the absence of firm monetary stimulus, jobs programs, and other public sector initiatives.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
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An Approach to Analyzing Current Economic Problems
To begin with the conventional wisdom, most government and private sector forecasters foresee solid but moderate growth over the next two years or so. For example, the Fed reported in January that most of its regional bank presidents and board members expect GDP to grow 3.4 percent this year and 3.9 percent in 2012 (Federal Reserve 2011b) . On the other hand, it has become almost a cliché to point out that improvement in the labor market is lagging behind the recovery in output growth.
The Fed's forecasts of the unemployment rate range from 8.8 to 9.0 percent for this year and from 7.6 to 8.1 percent for 2012.
These forecasts do not differ greatly from other widely reported forecasts and projections, and the "beige book" reports on individual geographic regions did not seem to be greatly at odds with these earlier forecasts.
This analysis focuses on the risks and possibilities ahead for the US economy. 1 We use a Keynesian framework, in which the strength of demand for goods and services matters a great deal more than most observers seem to realize, even after years of high unemployment. We consider the strength and durability of the weak expansion that appears to have begun in 2009 and consider various diagnoses for the weak US labor market using publicly available data and commentary, as well as the perspective offered by the work of Keynes and his followers. We focus on data related to four markets that have shown signs of stress for most of the last several years: financial markets, markets for household goods and services, commodity markets, and labor markets. This approach does not yield numerical forecasts of economic variables but it will help us to obtain some clues about the shortterm outlook for the country's economic well-being, in the narrow sense of output and income. It will also cast light on some longer-run threats that will be important over the next five years or so and indeed have the potential to wreak economic havoc during that time. In particular, dangers and stresses in the financial and banking systems are presently very serious, though they are difficult to measure and forecast in precise terms. The paper ends with some ideas about macroeconomic policies appropriate to our time. The main concern of deficit skeptics is a possible drain on capital markets that would sap resources that could be used more productively by the private sector. Anti-Keynesian commentators see deficits leading to higher interest rates and taxes over some unspecified long run, a development that would in their view greatly hinder growth within a year or two after fiscal stimulus. As we will see below, however, interest rates are low by historical standards. This is one of many signs that monetarist scenarios leading to high inflation or hyperinflation are not being played out. These observations must be kept in mind when isolated data points or events in a few sectors are taken as empirical support for critiques of policy activism that rely upon the quantity theory of money and other traditional economic doctrines.
Consumer spending, it is often noted, accounts for more than one-half of GDP. Standards for loans to the private sector tightened greatly during the financial crisis but have since loosened a great deal, according to data from the Fed's survey of senior loan officers (see Figure 1 ). Now, in sharp contrast to the situation that has prevailed for most of the last three years, less than half of surveyed banks are tightening credit standards.
Overall, consumer credit has yet to expand after stagnating during the Great Recession (again, see Figure 1 ), though the bleak picture painted by recent data on credit-card debt levels as of Inflation is often regarded as the chief enemy of bondholders, one of many links that connect controversies about macroeconomic policy to concerns about the cost and availability of finance and capital. To wit, critics of Keynesian policies argue that recent deficits and monetary policy actions will inevitably lead to an increase in inflation that not only angers consumers, but also ultimately raises nominal interest rates for mortgages and business loans. Defying recent arguments to this effect, the data in Figure 4 show that inflation at the level of the consumer remains very much in check, with no upward trend after the passage of three fiscal stimulus packages and more than two years of near-zero short-term interest rates. In January, headline personal consumption expenditure inflation was 3.5 percent, while the annual rate of inflation in consumer prices excluding food and energy items was only 1.5 percent. These inflation rates rose in February data, but other key data released in March suggest that the economy is stagnating or weakening further. Moreover, This theory has not been borne out in practice following the policy response to the Great Recession. As we saw before, rounds 1 and 2 of quantitative easing (QE) and recent reductions in the federal funds rate have not generated unintended impacts on inflation sufficient to reverse the effects of monetary policy easing on real yields. More generally, expansionary policy has not only reduced the yields of low-risk, short-term securities, but it has also resulted in lower rates for other types of issues and loans crucial to corporate bottom lines. Hence, it is not surprising that Fed Chairman Bernanke's public statements still give no hint that he plans to call off the Fed's recent "unconventional" policy actions before their scheduled end date in June (Hilsenrath and Crittenden 2011) . This increases our confidence in the stability of the financial system.
The Market for Goods and Services: Stronger, but

Not Strong Enough
Perhaps indicating that recent policy has been somewhat successful, many signs have appeared of an ongoing expansion in the demand for goods and services produced in the United States. In particular, both monetary easing and fiscal stimulus have had some impact on demand by the US sector that is financially weakest: the household sector. We saw above that credit standards for this sector appear to have eased significantly fol- Figure 7 shows that seasonally adjusted industrial production was flat in February and has still not attained its earlier peak.
This disappointing announcement follows hard on the heels of January's encouraging 2.9 percent annual growth rate for industrial production.
In light of the constraints on US consumers discussed in the section on financial markets, much hope resides in the export sector of American commerce, where, unfortunately, the signs Nonetheless, there are still signs of hope in this regard. As shown in the same figure, the Fed's trade-weighted exchangerate index for the dollar's value against major foreign currencies still seems to be on a downward trajectory, a trend that was reinforced by rising interest rates overseas following the ECB's intimation that it would begin tightening its policy stance. The dollar has also depreciated somewhat vis-à-vis the Chinese currency, a development that will be helpful to US GDP economic growth, especially when its effect is combined with increased inflationary pressures in much of Asia. Such trends, which depreciate the dollar in real terms, tend to make US exports less expensive for foreign buyers and raise the price of imports sold in the United States.
Recent monthly data show that the trade deficit widened by about $6 billion in January, to $46 billion, a disappointing result that was largely due to increases in the cost of imported petro- has not been making a big dent in US standards of living during that time (Figure 9 ). However, one can see a dramatic effect on the amount of agricultural commodities that can be purchased with the median weekly paycheck. Illustrating this trend, Figure 9 shows nominal earnings divided by the producer price subindex for grains. This "grain earnings" series gives one the sense that consumers are likely to be feeling a strain at the supermarket checkout lane when they buy items made from wheat, corn, and other cereal grains. Increases in commodity prices also adversely affect firms' production costs, which is one reason commodity inflations like the current one have tended to promote overall inflation and hinder growth at the same time.
Many economists dismiss popular concerns that recent rises in raw materials prices could spur an increase in inflation, on the grounds that in high-income countries, these commodities account for only a small share of GDP. And not only that, most mainstream academic macroeconomists and policy officials believe that increases in these prices will not start an ongoing consumer-price inflation as long as the Fed maintains a credible monetary policy strategy, one that commits policymakers in one way or another to a fight against core inflation that could come at great cost to output and employment (Barro and Gordon 1983; Calvo 1978; Kydland and Prescott 1977; Rogoff 1985) . It is not always appreciated in the political discourse that this high-level confidence that inflation is contained arises from a modern economic theory, and certainly not from an extreme fealty to the Keynesian school of macroeconomics or from long and successful experience with the current Fed's monetary policy doctrine.
The aforementioned "modern" view on inflation containment, which rests on the importance of "time consistent" policy, may prove incorrect if challenged by one or more severe supply shocks. In fact, Alan Blinder and Jeremy Rudd (2008) 
The Vexed Labor Market and Stubborn
Unemployment Rate
We now turn to this issue, which continues to vex the US economy. As shown in Figure 10 , BLS household survey data show that the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate stood at 8.9 percent in February, reflecting only a tiny drop from the previous month's level of 9.0 percent. According to the BLS's separate survey of businesses, payrolls rose by 192,000 workers in February.
Figure 10 puts these data in perspective, demonstrating that the unemployed for more than 27 weeks, and in the BLS's U-6 labor underutilization measure, which adds to the standard unemployment rate the percentage of the labor force that is either out of work but not searching for a job or involuntarily working less than full time. The most recent data point in this latter gauge was 15.9 percent, representing more than one in seven civilian workers wishing that they could find more work in the labor market.
February's survey data followed a more ambiguous and somewhat confusing set of data that was summarized in the pre- becomes clear that these two data sources were actually in agreement that many fewer people were employed in January than in December, though the two estimates were very different. Nonseasonally adjusted data from the household survey showed a loss of 1.56 million jobs in January, of which 472,000 could be accounted for by a change in the methods used by the BLS to estimate the total population. This means that well over one million fewer people were employed in January than in December on a seasonally unadjusted basis, according to the household survey. Meanwhile, the BLS's survey of employers found a net employment increase of 36,000 jobs after seasonal adjustment.
Before seasonal adjustment, there was a loss of 2.9 million jobs, a staggering figure that was not widely reported or commented on following the release of the BLS data in early February.
Revised January figures that were released in March showed a much higher payroll increase of 63,000 jobs for the month, but the unadjusted results were still abysmal after the revision. However, in examining the January employment report, there is another way of looking at the choice of seasonally adjusted versus non-seasonally adjusted data. Whether or not reported job losses were normal for this time of year, we must keep in mind that with many fewer jobs and more unemployed people than at the end of last year, there is an increased need to create job opportunities.
How Will the Job Market Slump Come to an End?
Can such a goal be realistic? Our colleagues at the Levy Institute have done extensive work on various proposals for jobs programs and on the recent stimulus bills (e.g., Antonopoulos et al. 2010) .
From the other side of the debate, there has been much work criticizing public sector efforts to alleviate job losses in the last few months. The invective is strong. "New Keynesian" macro- The federal budget situation (shown in Figure 11 There is no reason to pay such a large price in lost productivity and human well-being at a time when large deficits are still needed anyway. Since state and local governments do not have their own "state monies" and are often constitutionally bound to balance their budgets, they lack the ability to spend the amounts of money required to save some of the essential programs that lie mostly within their bailiwick, rather than that of the federal government (Hannsgen and Papadimitriou 2010) .
Some examples are education, law enforcement, sanitation, public transit, public hospitals, and medical programs for the poor. and regions of the country. Additional "revenue sharing" for states and localities would be a worthwhile and cost-effective form of new federal spending to aid workers and labor markets, as James Galbraith (2008) 
